Growth-friendly dictatorships

In highly unequal societies, a dictatorship may generate higher growth rates than a democracy. * Long-lasting dictators with an encompassing interest implement growth-friendly policies. * A rent-seeking and self-maximizing dictator may be supported by a fraction of the population. This research argues that in highly unequal societies, a rent-seeking and self-maximizing dictator may be supported by a fraction of the population, despite the absence of special benefits to these societal groups. Importantly, it is the stakes of the dictator in the economy, in the form of capital ownership, that dr... Mehr ...

Verfasser: Giacomo De Luca
Dokumenttyp: Artikel
Reihe/Periodikum: Journal of comparative economics
Verlag/Hrsg.: Amsterdam, Elsevier
Sprache: Englisch
ISSN: 0147-5967
Weitere Identifikatoren: doi: 10.1016/j.jce.2013.09.002
Permalink: https://search.fid-benelux.de/Record/olc-benelux-1965001165
URL: NULL
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Datenquelle: Online Contents Benelux; Originalkatalog
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Link(s) : http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2013.09.002
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2013.09.002
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