Growth-friendly dictatorships
In highly unequal societies, a dictatorship may generate higher growth rates than a democracy. * Long-lasting dictators with an encompassing interest implement growth-friendly policies. * A rent-seeking and self-maximizing dictator may be supported by a fraction of the population. This research argues that in highly unequal societies, a rent-seeking and self-maximizing dictator may be supported by a fraction of the population, despite the absence of special benefits to these societal groups. Importantly, it is the stakes of the dictator in the economy, in the form of capital ownership, that dr... Mehr ...
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Dokumenttyp: | Artikel |
Reihe/Periodikum: | Journal of comparative economics |
Verlag/Hrsg.: |
Amsterdam,
Elsevier
|
Sprache: | Englisch |
ISSN: | 0147-5967 |
Weitere Identifikatoren: | doi: 10.1016/j.jce.2013.09.002 |
Permalink: | https://search.fid-benelux.de/Record/olc-benelux-1965001165 |
URL: | NULL NULL |
Datenquelle: | Online Contents Benelux; Originalkatalog |
Powered By: | Verbundzentrale des GBV (VZG) |
Link(s) : | http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2013.09.002
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2013.09.002 |