Survivors Benefits and Conjugal Behavior. Evidence from the Netherlands

This paper investigates the impact of survivors insurance on marital behavior. We study the 1996 Dutch reform which considerably tightened eligibility rules to survivors' benefits. Exploiting a discontinuity in date of birth eligibility to survivors insurance and using a rich and exhaustive of the Dutch population administrative dataset, we carry out a regression discontinuity design and we find no evidence of the reform on divorce probability. Exploring possible explanations for our zero-effect result, we study how labor supply responses can compensate the income drop the reform induced. We f... Mehr ...

Verfasser: Tréguier, Julie
Rabaté, Simon
Dokumenttyp: preprint
Erscheinungsdatum: 2021
Verlag/Hrsg.: HAL CCSD
Schlagwörter: JEL: H - Public Economics/H.H3 - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents/H.H3.H31 - Household / JEL: J - Labor and Demographic Economics/J.J1 - Demographic Economics/J.J1.J12 - Marriage • Marital Dissolution • Family Structure • Domestic Abuse / JEL: I - Health / Education / and Welfare/I.I3 - Welfare / Well-Being / and Poverty/I.I3.I38 - Government Policy • Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs / JEL: J - Labor and Demographic Economics/J.J2 - Demand and Supply of Labor/J.J2.J22 - Time Allocation and Labor Supply / JEL: J - Labor and Demographic Economics/J.J4 - Particular Labor Markets/J.J4.J48 - Public Policy / [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance
Sprache: Englisch
Permalink: https://search.fid-benelux.de/Record/base-29574716
Datenquelle: BASE; Originalkatalog
Powered By: BASE
Link(s) : https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-03156317

This paper investigates the impact of survivors insurance on marital behavior. We study the 1996 Dutch reform which considerably tightened eligibility rules to survivors' benefits. Exploiting a discontinuity in date of birth eligibility to survivors insurance and using a rich and exhaustive of the Dutch population administrative dataset, we carry out a regression discontinuity design and we find no evidence of the reform on divorce probability. Exploring possible explanations for our zero-effect result, we study how labor supply responses can compensate the income drop the reform induced. We find a strong increase in the labor force participation of widows after the reform. However this response does not completely offset the decrease in income generated form the cut in survivors benefits.