Screening disability insurance applications

This paper investigates the effects of stricter screening of disability insurance applications. A large-scale experiment was setup where in two of the 26 Dutch regions case workers of the disability insurance administration were instructed to screen applications more stringently. The empirical results show that stricter screening reduces long-term sickness absenteeism and disability insurance applications. We find evidence for direct effects of stricter screening on work resumption during the period of sickness absence and for self-screening by potential disability insurance applicants. Strict... Mehr ...

Verfasser: de Jong, Philip
Lindeboom, Maarten
van der Klaauw, Bas
Dokumenttyp: doc-type:workingPaper
Erscheinungsdatum: 2006
Verlag/Hrsg.: Uppsala: Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation (IFAU)
Schlagwörter: ddc:330 / J26 / J65 / Disability insurance / experiment / policy evaluation / sickness absenteeism / self-screening / Behindertenpolitik / Behinderte Arbeitskräfte / Versicherung / Fehlzeit / Kontrolle / Kosten-Nutzen-Analyse / Niederlande
Sprache: Englisch
Permalink: https://search.fid-benelux.de/Record/base-29231644
Datenquelle: BASE; Originalkatalog
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Link(s) : http://hdl.handle.net/10419/78674