Using Employer Hiring Behavior to Test the Educational Signaling Hypothesis

This paper presents a test of the educational signaling hypothesis. If employers use education as a signal in the hiring process, they will rely more on education when less is otherwise known about applicants. We find that employers are more likely to lower educational standards when an informal, more informative recruitment channel is used, so we conclude that education is used as a signal in the hiring process.

Verfasser: Albrecht, James
van Ours, Jan C.
Dokumenttyp: doc-type:workingPaper
Erscheinungsdatum: 2001
Verlag/Hrsg.: Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Schlagwörter: ddc:330 / I20 / Recruitment / signaling / Personalbeschaffung / Qualifikation / Signalling / Schätzung / Niederlande
Sprache: Englisch
Permalink: https://search.fid-benelux.de/Record/base-29231347
Datenquelle: BASE; Originalkatalog
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Link(s) : http://hdl.handle.net/10419/21259