In December 1979, NATO adopted Dual Track. This resolution had two tracks: the modernisation of NATO’s Theatre Nuclear Forces and an offer to arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union. At the time, the Netherlands conditionally accepted Dual Track. Dutch opposition to nuclear modernisation was too great. The government postponed the decision for two years, linking it to the results of arms control negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union. In the end, the postponement would last for six years. The crisis that followed the Dual Track decision would become known as the Euromissile Crisis. The goal of this thesis is two-fold. On the one hand, the goal is to explore the reasoning behind this postponement. It will look into the domestic and international factors that influenced Dutch decision-making. The Dutch public did not want to deploy new missiles, whereas the NATO allies pressured the government to make a decision. This thesis has shown that domestic pressures were incredibly influential at the beginning of the crisis. That is why Dual Track was conditionally accepted. However, international factors, such as the need for solidarity within NATO, increased significantly over time. On the other hand, it researches how Dutch margins for manoeuvre were increased during the Euromissile Crisis. In line with New Cold War History, this thesis argues that the Netherlands was not just a small state that had to follow the path the bigger NATO states decided. There was the opportunity to push its own agenda. Â