The legislation and regulations which seek to guarantee good governance in the Caribbean parts of the Dutch Kingdom are similar to the Netherlands. Nevertheless, the administrative performance in the West is significantly inferior to that of the latter. To explain this difference, this thesis highlights the fact that the legislation in the West codifies norms of conduct that are dominant in modern Western societies. However, due to the small-scale, the poverty and the stratification of the insular societies other norms of conduct are dominant in the Caribbean parts of the Dutch Kingdom. To maintain their position politicians depend on electoral support. Therefore they should act according to the norms of conduct that are generally accepted within society. As a result an incentive for politicians is manifest to act contrary to the appropriate line. In the practice of the Caribbean overseas territories this incentive results especially in political patronage. Yet, the examples of Barbados and Anguilla learn that despite the fact that small-scale, poverty and social stratification are unalterable good governance is still possible. Where, however, the high quality of governance in Barbados should especially be ascribed to the de-politicization of the distribution power of public goods of the executive branch, the high quality of governance in Anguilla is mainly due to the supervision of London. Because it should not to be expected that the administrative elite in the Caribbean parts of the Dutch Kingdom will adjust their state system on their own initiative, good governance will in the first place depend on the willingness of the Netherlands to play an active role in the local administrative affairs of the islands in the West.