Institutional dynamics in environmental corporatism: The impact of market and technological change on the Dutch polder model

This paper describes how market and technological change can be conceived to affect corporatist politics in the area of waste management. The paper adopts a political economy approach to in-stitutional change which seeks to trace the impact of market and techological change on estab-lished political and regulatory institutions. The paper demonstrates that the main impact of mar-ketization of waste services and the introduction of ISO 14001 environmental management sys-tems was to expand the range of choices for companies and regulators to engage in regulatory interaction concerning environment... Mehr ...

Verfasser: Tjiong, Henri
Dokumenttyp: doc-type:workingPaper
Erscheinungsdatum: 2002
Verlag/Hrsg.: Bonn: Max-Planck-Projektgruppe Recht der Gemeinschaftsgüter
Schlagwörter: ddc:330 / Verpackungs-Recycling / Selbstverpflichtung / Umweltpolitik / Korporatismus / Institutioneller Wandel / Abfallwirtschaft / Horizontale Konzentration / Produkt-Recycling / Umweltmanagement / Standardisierung / Niederlande
Sprache: Englisch
Permalink: https://search.fid-benelux.de/Record/base-29049282
Datenquelle: BASE; Originalkatalog
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Link(s) : http://hdl.handle.net/10419/85136

This paper describes how market and technological change can be conceived to affect corporatist politics in the area of waste management. The paper adopts a political economy approach to in-stitutional change which seeks to trace the impact of market and techological change on estab-lished political and regulatory institutions. The paper demonstrates that the main impact of mar-ketization of waste services and the introduction of ISO 14001 environmental management sys-tems was to expand the range of choices for companies and regulators to engage in regulatory interaction concerning environmental waste management practices. The main purpose of the paper is to demonstrate exactly how the emergence of regulatory choices for both companies and regulators is likely to open up new avenues for regulation in the environmental field that, once pursued, systematically reduce incentives for corporate and regulatory actors to engage in associational politics.