Inspired by Ostrom’s Governing the Commons (1990), this thesis examines fisheries collective action in the Dutch brown shrimp fishery. The study was conducted as a qualitative case study, with semi-structured interviews and an analysis of literature and secondary sources as the main research methods. Taking the perspective of the appropriators, the main collective action problem turned out to be related to market stabilisation, instead of resource conservation. Parallel to state regulation, two collective self-governance mechanisms were observed in this fishery: the MSC plan for resource conservation and the Production and Marketing Plan (PMP) for market stabilisation. One of the findings of the study is that the competition of the multiple producer organisations on the favour of the fishers currently hinders the operation of the PMP, as the producer organisations are responsible for monitoring and sanctioning of their members. The thesis challenges the fisheries paradigm that resource conservation will automatically create a stable income for fishers, as in this case, market stabilisation posed a separate collective action problem next to the collective action problem of resource conservation. Furthermore, it encourages fisheries scientists to take a more critical approach towards the application collective self-governance in fisheries management, as well as to discuss fisheries collective action in the light of market competitiveness, as collective action has the potential to create a ‘monopoly fishery’, but that this does not necessarily has to be the case.