Looking at competition agencies world wide, we can see the emergence of a new trend, with more and more agencies merging with others and creating new combinations. Competition agencies are consequently moving away from being single-function bodies and instead becoming multifunctional authorities housing antitrust and regulatory functions under one roof. Competition literature has so far devoted little attention to the institutional design of such organizations and the implementation of their policy goals. The focus has been on substantive matters of competition law, rather than on governance aspects and optimal design. This article analyzes the merger on 1 April 2013 of the Netherlands Competition Authority (NMa), the Independent Post and Telecommunications Authority (OPTA) and the Consumer Authority (CA) in the newly created Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM). This Dutch case is used to illustrate how a bundling of tasks can be translated into an institutional strategy and to examine the implementation issues arising. Which factors matter when deciding to combine a series of functions under one roof? By taking an inside look at this case, we can learn lessons for other jurisdictions. The article examines the subject from a legal, political science, and public administration perspective.