Payments for environmental services with provision thresholds: farmers' preferences for a conditional bonus ; Payments for environmental services with provision thresholds: farmers' preferences for a conditional bonus: Contributed Paper prepared for presentation at the 96th Annual Conference of the Agricultural Economics Society, K U Leuven, Belgium
International audience ; The effectiveness of payment schemes for delivering agri-environmental public goods with provision thresholds (biodiversity, water quality) depends on reaching enough farmland enrolment at the landscape scale. Supporting the development of collaborative approaches with a financial bonus conditioned to a collective element on top of an individual basic payment is a promising way to favour participation and continuity of environmental commitments in an area. However, little is known on farmers' attitudes towards such mixed-payment mechanisms. Using a choice experiment, w... Mehr ...
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Dokumenttyp: | conferenceObject |
Erscheinungsdatum: | 2022 |
Verlag/Hrsg.: |
HAL CCSD
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Schlagwörter: | Water quality / Choice experiment / Collective action / Payment for environmental services / Conditional bonus / [SDE.ES]Environmental Sciences/Environment and Society / [SHS]Humanities and Social Sciences |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Permalink: | https://search.fid-benelux.de/Record/base-28947101 |
Datenquelle: | BASE; Originalkatalog |
Powered By: | BASE |
Link(s) : | https://institut-agro-rennes-angers.hal.science/hal-03699623 |
International audience ; The effectiveness of payment schemes for delivering agri-environmental public goods with provision thresholds (biodiversity, water quality) depends on reaching enough farmland enrolment at the landscape scale. Supporting the development of collaborative approaches with a financial bonus conditioned to a collective element on top of an individual basic payment is a promising way to favour participation and continuity of environmental commitments in an area. However, little is known on farmers' attitudes towards such mixed-payment mechanisms. Using a choice experiment, we measure farmers' preferences towards an individual bonus for sponsoring peers, which can be combined with a collective bonus for improving the ecological quality of rivers in northwestern France. Applying a mixed logit model, we find that respondents have a positive willingness to accept contracts with a sponsor bonus, but a negative willingness to accept a sponsor bonus combined with a bonus for reaching a collective environmental objective. We characterize respondents' heterogeneity with a latent class model and identify 3 different attitudes towards the bonus options: (i) negative preferences for both, particularly for the combined bonus, (ii) indifference, (iii) positive preferences for both, even higher for the combined bonus.