Response to imported case of Marburg hemorrhagic fever, the Netherlands

On July 10, 2008, Marburg hemorrhagic fever was con-firmed in a Dutch patient who had vacationed recently in Uganda. Exposure most likely occurred in the Python Cave (Maramagambo Forest), which harbors bat species that elsewhere in Africa have been found positive for Marburg virus. A multidisciplinary response team was convened to perform a structured risk assessment, perform risk classi-fication of contacts, issue guidelines for follow-up, provide information, and monitor the crisis response. In total, 130 contacts were identified (66 classified as high risk and 64 as low risk) and monitored... Mehr ...

Verfasser: Timen, A. (Aura)
Koopmans D.V.M., M.P.G. (Marion)
Vossen, A.C.Th.M. (Ann)
Doornum, G.J.J. (Gerard) van
Günther, S. (Stephan)
Berkmortel, F.W.P.J. (Franchette) van den
Verduin, C.M. (Cees)
Dittrich, S. (Sabine)
Emmerich, P. (Petra)
Osterhaus, A.D.M.E. (Albert)
Dissel, J.T. (Jaap) van
Coutinho, R.A. (Roel)
Dokumenttyp: other
Erscheinungsdatum: 2009
Schlagwörter: Marburg virus / Netherlands / Uganda / adult / case report / female / follow up / high risk patient / human / import disease / infection risk / patient monitoring / practice guideline / review / risk assessment / travel / virus hemorrhagic fever
Sprache: Englisch
Permalink: https://search.fid-benelux.de/Record/base-28786091
Datenquelle: BASE; Originalkatalog
Powered By: BASE
Link(s) : http://repub.eur.nl/pub/17116

On July 10, 2008, Marburg hemorrhagic fever was con-firmed in a Dutch patient who had vacationed recently in Uganda. Exposure most likely occurred in the Python Cave (Maramagambo Forest), which harbors bat species that elsewhere in Africa have been found positive for Marburg virus. A multidisciplinary response team was convened to perform a structured risk assessment, perform risk classi-fication of contacts, issue guidelines for follow-up, provide information, and monitor the crisis response. In total, 130 contacts were identified (66 classified as high risk and 64 as low risk) and monitored for 21 days after their last possible exposure. The case raised questions specific to international travel, postexposure prophylaxis for Marburg virus, and laboratory testing of contacts with fever. We present lessons learned and results of the follow-up serosurvey of contacts and focus on factors that prevented overreaction during an event with a high public health impact.