The logistics of a military operation offer great possibilities to researchers within the framework of a military historiography traditionally preferentially focused on the study of tactics and strategy. These two elements in the study of war have helped to interrelate financial and political systems in governments with the outcome of conflicts. However, when referring to military logistics in any historical period, researchers ought to consider that this field of study also refers to very real organizational and administrative stress due to the need to shorten the times for preparations to face the looming conflict. The outcome, victory or defeat, success, or failure, of any military operation, is partly conditioned by the assumption of greater or lesser diligence regarding logistics war, which to some extent is not directly tied either to national economy or good and bad government decisions. In this article, the logistics of the first war fought by Philipp II -the sixth one against France- will be partially examined. It took place in two settings: Italy and the French-Flemish front, in 1557 and 1558. The territory referred to in this work will only be that of the so-called northern front. These military operations posed the considerable inconvenience of having to gather and transfer material resources and troops to the frontline, which was more than 1,500 kilometers away from Castile. Despite the great economic and organizational wear to the Hispanic Monarchy generally caused by this conditioning, those two years saw an exceptional display of logistics. This would be the main motive behind the interest of analyzing this war, being the alliance with England and the English Channel, however, a great geostrategic asset. Furthermore, preparations for expeditions from the Spanish Peninsula activated the emperor's old machinery from previous wars, as they were years of transition between the two reigns. However, the urgency to diligently organize expeditions occurring in very different circumstances gave way to ...