No (true) right to die: barriers in access to physician-assisted death in case of psychiatric disease, advanced dementia or multiple geriatric syndromes in the Netherlands

Abstract Even in the Netherlands, where the practice of physician-assisted death (PAD) has been legalized for over 20 years, there is no such thing as a ‘right to die’. Especially patients with extraordinary requests, such as a wish for PAD based on psychiatric suffering, advanced dementia, or (a limited number of) multiple geriatric syndromes, encounter barriers in access to PAD. In this paper, we discuss whether these barriers can be justified in the context of the Dutch situation where PAD is legally permitted for those who suffer unbearably and hopelessly as a result of medical conditions.... Mehr ...

Verfasser: van den Ende, Caroline
Asscher, Eva Constance Alida
Dokumenttyp: Artikel
Erscheinungsdatum: 2024
Reihe/Periodikum: Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy ; volume 27, issue 2, page 181-188 ; ISSN 1386-7423 1572-8633
Verlag/Hrsg.: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Sprache: Englisch
Permalink: https://search.fid-benelux.de/Record/base-27627428
Datenquelle: BASE; Originalkatalog
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Link(s) : http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11019-023-10190-8

Abstract Even in the Netherlands, where the practice of physician-assisted death (PAD) has been legalized for over 20 years, there is no such thing as a ‘right to die’. Especially patients with extraordinary requests, such as a wish for PAD based on psychiatric suffering, advanced dementia, or (a limited number of) multiple geriatric syndromes, encounter barriers in access to PAD. In this paper, we discuss whether these barriers can be justified in the context of the Dutch situation where PAD is legally permitted for those who suffer unbearably and hopelessly as a result of medical conditions. Furthermore, we explore whether there are options to address some of the barriers or their consequences, both within the Dutch legal framework or by adjusting the legal framework, and whether these options are feasible. We conclude that although there are insufficient arguments to overrule the doctor’s freedom of conscience in the Netherlands, there are ways to address some of the barriers, mainly by offering support to doctors that would be willing to support a request. Moreover, we believe it is morally required to reduce or mitigate where possible the negative consequences of the barriers for patients, such as the long waiting time for those who suffer from psychiatric disorders, because it is unlikely the adjustments suggested to the system will ensure reasonable access for these patient groups.