This thesis focuses on developing conceptual models to examine the role of futures markets for risk-shifting, incentives and coordination costs in the context of commodity marketing channels. The empirical analysis is conducted for different marketing channel structures (two-stage and three-stage marketing channels) and for different situations regarding the availability of a futures market ( i.e ., with and without futures markets). The conceptual models have been applied to the Dutch potato marketing channel.We model and empirically examine incentives, coordination costs, and risk-shifting in the Dutch ware potato marketing channel that includes producers and marketing firms ( e.g. , retailers), when these marketing channel members (MCMs) are allowed to trade on spot markets only. We apply the classic agency model to investigate risk shifting in the Dutch ware potato marketing channel, using time-series analysis. We show that, if the principal (marketing firm) is risk neutral and the agent (producer) is risk averse instead of risk neutral, a linear contract can still be optimal if the fixed payment is negative. The empirical results over the period 1946 - 2003 indicate that, while fixed payments to farmers (agents) have decreased over time since the 1980s to become more and more negative, the incentive intensity has approximately doubled, and the risk premium that farmers demand has remained considerable. Moreover, since the mid 1960s, risk has shifted from retailers to farmers. We argue that this shift could be the consequence of chain reversal, i.e ., the transformation of the traditional supply chain into a demand-oriented chain. From the mid 1980s on, potato growers have had to pay an increasing amount of fixed compensation to the marketing firms. As a percentage of output value at consumer prices, as received by the marketing firms, this compensation has increased from -43% in 1948 to 23% in 1998. This value, however, decreased to 15% in 2003. Nevertheless, together with the rise in the output-value ...