Food borne illness today still results in high societal costs, even though FBOs have implemented food safety control systems. In addition, the susceptibility to food borne diseases of the human population is likely to increase in the coming decades. Thus food safety control needs to be improved. Since 2005, a new EU food safety policy aims to improve food safety through shifting primary responsibility for food safety from government to FBOs and through shifting food safety control from company level to supply chain level. This research aims to contribute to improvement of food safety by analyzing private incentive mechanisms aimed at food safety control on supply chain level. It focuses on the two stage supply chain between pig producers and slaughter company in the Netherlands. A framework for designing and developing incentive mechanisms for food safety control is developed. An incentive mechanism aimed at food safety control is defined as the set of the performance and compliance measurement system and the compensation scheme between buyer and supplier, which aims to induce the supplier to apply measures to control food safety hazards as the buyer requests. The framework includes all important characteristics of incentive mechanisms for food safety and their relationships. In this thesis the influence on supplier behaviour of four important characteristics of incentive mechanisms for food safety control are analysed, namely 1) the type of performance compensation, 2) the causes for variability in performance between suppliers, 3) the accuracy of a test to determine supplier performance, and 4) the reliability of information provided by the supplier. It uses different food safety hazards in pork: lesioned livers, Mycobacterium avium, and residues of antibiotics. Results show that a penalty for each lesioned liver was more effective to induce pig producers to use control measures than a collective premium. Variability in liver lesion prevalence between pig producers with a penalty for each lesioned liver ...