The power politics of international tax cooperation : why Luxembourg and Austria accepted automatic exchange of information on foreign account holders' interest income
Theories of tax competition predict that small countries competing with large countries benefit, as they find it relatively easy to substitute revenue lost in a tax cut with revenue gained from incoming foreign tax base. If small countries can only lose from tax co-operation, why are Luxembourg and Austria bound to agree to a revised EU Savings Tax Directive that will oblige them to automatically provide information on foreign account holders’ interest income to residence countries? Putting emphasis on the neglected issue of power, I show that Luxembourg and Austria were first coerced into bil... Mehr ...
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Dokumenttyp: | workingPaper |
Erscheinungsdatum: | 2014 |
Schlagwörter: | International political economy / Tax competition / EU politics / Power politics / Tax policy / Two-step approach |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Permalink: | https://search.fid-benelux.de/Record/base-27517906 |
Datenquelle: | BASE; Originalkatalog |
Powered By: | BASE |
Link(s) : | http://hdl.handle.net/1814/30414 |