Auctions versus negotiations: The role of price discrimination

Auctions are a popular and prevalent form of trading mechanism, despite the restriction that the seller cannot price-discriminate among potential buyers. To understand why this is the case, we consider an auction-like environment in which a seller with an indivisible object negotiates with two asymmetric buyers to determine who obtains the object and at what price. The trading process resembles the Dutch auction, except that the seller is allowed to offer different prices to different buyers. We show that when the seller can commit to a price path in advance, the optimal outcome can generally... Mehr ...

Verfasser: Chen, Chia-Hui
Ishida, Junichiro
Dokumenttyp: doc-type:workingPaper
Erscheinungsdatum: 2013
Verlag/Hrsg.: Osaka: Osaka University
Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
Schlagwörter: ddc:330 / D44 / D82 / dutch auction / second-price auction / negotiation / commitment / price discrimination / asymmetric buyers / Preisdifferenzierung / Asymmetrische Information / Auktionstheorie
Sprache: Englisch
Permalink: https://search.fid-benelux.de/Record/base-27465869
Datenquelle: BASE; Originalkatalog
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Link(s) : http://hdl.handle.net/10419/92578