Dutch prosecutors are members of the judiciary, charged with executing the tasks of the Public Prosecution Service (PPS). Their role is quasi-judicial, like that of a magistrate. However, they do not enjoy the same independence as judges. Their activities are partly determined by government policy, so they also have a role as public servants. Furthermore prosecutors can be seen as frontline workers as they must meet demands made by law, policy, the courts and the other participants in a criminal case in order to have their decisions accepted easily (and thus in order to work efficiently). In 1985 Van de Bunt conceptualized these three prosecutorial roles and showed the tensions to which they give rise. I present new research into the conception of and fulfilment of the duties by Dutch public prosecutors. It is based on participant observation (conducted in 2011), interviews and literature study. Public prosecutors still experience tension between the three ideal-typical roles. The institutionalization of the PPS adds a new dimension to that tension, which partly determines the quasi-judicial role of prosecutors. This can lead to the paradoxical situation that directives force a prosecutor to follow certain protocols or bureaucratic procedures in order to guarantee the quasi-judicial nature of his actions. Meanwhile, as frontline workers, they risk showing formal behaviour, preoccupied with procedural demands. While this is primarily indicative of tension between frontline worker and public servant, this preoccupation can stand in the way of quasi-judicial considerations. Prosecutors also sometimes demonstrate compliant behaviour: they acquiesce in (overly) high organizational thresholds that prevent them from acting in a quasi-judicial manner. They accept, for example, that mandataries take decisions on prosecution that lack quality. Concerns have been voiced about the ‘institutional preoccupation’ of the PPS, which could hinder autonomous, quasi-judicial decision-making by prosecutors in individual cases. ...