Joint Estimation of Mark-up and Bargaining Power Parameters for Belgian Manufacturing

This paper applies several extensions of Hall's (1988) methodology to analyse imperfections in both the product and the labour market for firms in the Belgian manufacturing industry over the period 1988-1995. We investigate (1) the heterogeneity in mark-up and bargaining power parameters among 17 sectors within the manufacturing industry, (2) whether higher bargaining power parameters are associated with higher mark-ups and (3) whether both parameters are influenced by cyclical and competition effects. Our GMM results indicate that ignoring imperfection in the labour market leads to an underes... Mehr ...

Verfasser: Dobbelaere, Sabien
Dokumenttyp: doc-type:workingPaper
Erscheinungsdatum: 2002
Verlag/Hrsg.: Leuven: Katholieke Universiteit Leuven
LICOS Centre for Transition Economics
Schlagwörter: ddc:330 / C23 / D21 / J50 / K21 / L13 / Efficient Bargaining / Price Setting / Market Power / Competition Policy / Enterprise Behaviour / Verarbeitendes Gewerbe / Lohnverhandlungen / Gewerkschaftsmitgliedschaft / Betriebliche Preispolitik / Marktmacht / Belgien
Sprache: Englisch
Permalink: https://search.fid-benelux.de/Record/base-27308521
Datenquelle: BASE; Originalkatalog
Powered By: BASE
Link(s) : http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74897

This paper applies several extensions of Hall's (1988) methodology to analyse imperfections in both the product and the labour market for firms in the Belgian manufacturing industry over the period 1988-1995. We investigate (1) the heterogeneity in mark-up and bargaining power parameters among 17 sectors within the manufacturing industry, (2) whether higher bargaining power parameters are associated with higher mark-ups and (3) whether both parameters are influenced by cyclical and competition effects. Our GMM results indicate that ignoring imperfection in the labour market leads to an underestimation in the price-cost margin of Belgian manufacturing firms. These findings are confirmed in the sectoral analysis. As expected, higher bargaining power parameters are associated with higher price-cost margins at the sectoral level. We find that both the mark-up and the bargaining power parameter move procyclically. Finally, after controlling for cyclical effects, our results show that the introduction of a new competition policy in Belgium in 1993 has exerted a statistically significant negative effect on the price mark-ups, leaving the bargaining strength of the workers unchanged. Hence, the stringent competition law seems to have disciplined firms?pricing behaviour.