Overcoming resistance against managed care: Insights from a bargaining model
Recent healthcare reforms have sought to increase efficiency by introducing managed care (MC) while respecting consumer preferences by admitting choice between MC and conventional care. This article proposes an institutional change designed to let German consumers choose between the two settings through directing payments from the Federal Health Fund to social health insurers (SHIs) or to specialized MC organizations (MCOs). To gauge the chance of success of this reform, a game involving a SHI, a MCO, and a representative insured (RI) is analyzed. In a 'three-player/three-cake' game the coalit... Mehr ...
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| Dokumenttyp: | doc-type:article |
| Erscheinungsdatum: | 2017 |
| Verlag/Hrsg.: |
Heidelberg: Springer
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| Schlagwörter: | ddc:330 / I13 / I11 / D02 / C72 / Managed care Game theory / Multilateral Nash bargaining / Health insurance / Consumer choice / Healthcare reform / Germany / The Netherlands / Switzerland |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Permalink: | https://search.fid-benelux.de/Record/base-27233492 |
| Datenquelle: | BASE; Originalkatalog |
| Powered By: | BASE |
| Link(s) : | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/175641 |
Recent healthcare reforms have sought to increase efficiency by introducing managed care (MC) while respecting consumer preferences by admitting choice between MC and conventional care. This article proposes an institutional change designed to let German consumers choose between the two settings through directing payments from the Federal Health Fund to social health insurers (SHIs) or to specialized MC organizations (MCOs). To gauge the chance of success of this reform, a game involving a SHI, a MCO, and a representative insured (RI) is analyzed. In a 'three-player/three-cake' game the coalitions