Using data covering 3 election moments (1988-2000) for 294 Flemish municipalities we examine whether the decision to cut tariffs before elections depends on the government’s expectations of staying into office. Election moments are central to both the political budget cycle literature and the strategic debt models. The combination of both theories could suggest that, at least in theory, both winning and loosing governments seem to benefit from preelectoral tariff reductions and as such we expect to find a great many municipalities to engage into tariff cuts. The dataset however shows this is clearly not the case. We argue that the differences in the fiscal policy reaction of governments facing elections might have to do with their expectations of staying into office. In our analysis we make the decision to change tariffs dependent on the expected vote percentage of the government party (parties). As we do not possess reliable ex ante data on the perceived re-election probability, we estimate a vote-function to predict the percentage of votes. Our analysis shows that tariff reductions in election years are more prone when governments expect not to reach majority again in next elections.