Rogue Traders. Dutch Businessmen, International Crimes and Corporate Complicity

Recently, in The Netherlands, two businessmen have been prosecuted for their involvement in the commission of international crimes. In this article, the cases are analysed in the broader context of corporate complicity in international crimes. We enquire as to which extent these cases are typical for addressing corporate complicity and what lessons can be drawn from them. The cases illustrate the empirical variety of corporate complicity in international crimes. Furthermore, they indicate that investigating corporate complicity and connecting business entities to international crimes is rather... Mehr ...

Verfasser: Huisman, W.
van Sliedregt, E.
Dokumenttyp: Artikel
Erscheinungsdatum: 2010
Reihe/Periodikum: Huisman , W & van Sliedregt , E 2010 , ' Rogue Traders. Dutch Businessmen, International Crimes and Corporate Complicity ' , Journal of International Criminal Justice , vol. 8 , no. 3 , pp. 803-828 . https://doi.org/10.1093/jicj/mqq040
Schlagwörter: /dk/atira/pure/sustainabledevelopmentgoals/peace_justice_and_strong_institutions / name=SDG 16 - Peace / Justice and Strong Institutions
Sprache: Englisch
Permalink: https://search.fid-benelux.de/Record/base-27075957
Datenquelle: BASE; Originalkatalog
Powered By: BASE
Link(s) : https://research.vu.nl/en/publications/bf2babcd-cf7b-4257-83a7-c3bc00203961

Recently, in The Netherlands, two businessmen have been prosecuted for their involvement in the commission of international crimes. In this article, the cases are analysed in the broader context of corporate complicity in international crimes. We enquire as to which extent these cases are typical for addressing corporate complicity and what lessons can be drawn from them. The cases illustrate the empirical variety of corporate complicity in international crimes. Furthermore, they indicate that investigating corporate complicity and connecting business entities to international crimes is rather difficult. Questions are raised as to the intended deterrent effect of such prosecutions. © Oxford University Press, 2010, All rights reserved.