EU-sentiment predicts the 2016 Dutch referendum vote on the EU’s association with Ukraine better than concerns about Russia or national discontent
This article utilises large-N panel data to compare two theories of referendum voting behaviour in order to understand the ‘for’ or ‘against’ vote in the 2016 Dutch referendum on the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. It studies the extent to which voting behaviour was predicted by Eurosceptic attitudes and fear of upsetting Russia (issue-based theory), versus dissatisfaction with the Dutch government and general political discontent (second-order theory). Our findings indicate that issue-based determinants predict the referendum vote better than second-order predictors. However, Eurosceptic at... Mehr ...
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Dokumenttyp: | Artikel |
Erscheinungsdatum: | 2023 |
Reihe/Periodikum: | Abts , K , Etienne , T , Kutiyski , Y & Krouwel , A 2023 , ' EU-sentiment predicts the 2016 Dutch referendum vote on the EU’s association with Ukraine better than concerns about Russia or national discontent ' , European Union Politics , vol. 24 , no. 3 , pp. 494-515 . https://doi.org/10.1177/14651165231157612 |
Schlagwörter: | Euroscepticism / referendum / Russia / the Netherlands / Ukraine / voting behaviour |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Permalink: | https://search.fid-benelux.de/Record/base-27075748 |
Datenquelle: | BASE; Originalkatalog |
Powered By: | BASE |
Link(s) : | https://research.vu.nl/en/publications/59f739a2-8083-461d-b224-7e3faeb6d1a7 |
This article utilises large-N panel data to compare two theories of referendum voting behaviour in order to understand the ‘for’ or ‘against’ vote in the 2016 Dutch referendum on the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. It studies the extent to which voting behaviour was predicted by Eurosceptic attitudes and fear of upsetting Russia (issue-based theory), versus dissatisfaction with the Dutch government and general political discontent (second-order theory). Our findings indicate that issue-based determinants predict the referendum vote better than second-order predictors. However, Eurosceptic attitudes and government satisfaction both outperform concerns about the relationship with Russia as a predictor. We thus provide evidence that the issue-based and second-order approaches to explain voting in EU referendums are complementary, but not equal in explanatory strength.