Wait, who Controls the Council? The Role of the Dutch Parliament and Organized Interests to Hold the Council of Ministers Accountable

This paper examines the role of organized interests as indirect scrutinizers of the Council of Ministers. Whereas the ministers of the Council are only accountable to national parliaments, the latter face many difficulties in controlling the former. This is problematic as it potentially increases the EU’s democratic deficit. This thesis researches a possible solution to this problem by testing McCubbins and Schwartz’s fire-alarm theory. McCubbins and Schwartz argue that organized interests can alarm national parliaments who can then scrutinize better. The research focuses on the Netherlands as... Mehr ...

Verfasser: Verboeket, Robert
Dokumenttyp: Artikel
Erscheinungsdatum: 2022
Verlag/Hrsg.: Maastricht University
Schlagwörter: Parliamentary oversight / Principal-agent model / interest groups / legislative studies / European Union
Sprache: Englisch
Permalink: https://search.fid-benelux.de/Record/base-27060076
Datenquelle: BASE; Originalkatalog
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Link(s) : http://openjournals.maastrichtuniversity.nl/Marble/article/view/881