Can Risk Adjustment prevent Risk Selection in a Competitive Long-Term Care Insurance Market?
When public long-term care (LTC) insurance is provided by insurers, they typically lack incentives for purchasing cost-effective LTC. Providing insurers with appropriate incentives for efficiency without jeopardizing access for high-risk individuals requires, among other things, an adequate system of risk adjustment. While risk adjustment is now widely adopted in health insurance, it is unclear whether adequate risk adjustment is feasible for LTC because of its specific features. We examine the feasibility of risk adjustment for LTC insurance using a rich set of linked nationwide Dutch adminis... Mehr ...
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Dokumenttyp: | doc-type:workingPaper |
Erscheinungsdatum: | 2013 |
Verlag/Hrsg.: |
Amsterdam and Rotterdam: Tinbergen Institute
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Schlagwörter: | ddc:330 / H51 / I11 / I13 / I18 / L13 / risk adjustment / long-term care / managed competition / public insurance / Risikomodell / Dauer / Adverse Selektion / Niederlande |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Permalink: | https://search.fid-benelux.de/Record/base-26860783 |
Datenquelle: | BASE; Originalkatalog |
Powered By: | BASE |
Link(s) : | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/87476 |