The Effects of Prize Spread and Noise in Elimination Tournaments: A Natural Field Experiment

We conduct a field experiment in a large retail chain to test basic predictions of tournament theory regarding prize spread and noise. A random subset of the 208 stores participates in two-stage elimination tournaments. Tournaments differ in the distribution of prize money across winners of the first and second round of the tournament. As predicted by theory, we find that a more convex prize spread increases performance in the second round at the expense of first-round performance, although the magnitude of these effects is small. Moreover, the treatment effect is significantly larger for stor... Mehr ...

Verfasser: Delfgaauw, Josse
Dur, Robert
Non, Arjan
Verbeke, Willem
Dokumenttyp: doc-type:workingPaper
Erscheinungsdatum: 2011
Verlag/Hrsg.: Amsterdam and Rotterdam: Tinbergen Institute
Schlagwörter: ddc:330 / C93 / M51 / M52 / Elimination tournaments / Incentives / Prize spread / Performance measurement / Field experiment / Extensives Spiel / Handelskette / Filiale / Wettbewerb / Feldforschung / Niederlande
Sprache: Englisch
Permalink: https://search.fid-benelux.de/Record/base-26860767
Datenquelle: BASE; Originalkatalog
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Link(s) : http://hdl.handle.net/10419/87167