This dissertation analyses perceived differentiation between the Netherlands and the United States in enforcing anti-corruption legislation. These two countries share jurisdiction over the world’s largest multinationals, many of which trade on the US stock exchange and have a corporate mailbox address in the Netherlands. I offer an explanation for the low levels of enforcement in the Netherlands until 2013, namely that the Dutch government had a limited sense of the harm corruption abroad caused, and a facilitating culture towards multinationals. Moreover, anti-corruption enforcement officials in the Netherlands lacked resources, expertise, skills and confidence to take on multinationals, particularly abroad. This situation changed in or around 2013, when the first three major anti-corruption settlements were concluded in the Netherlands. During my research, Dutch anti-corruption changed dramatically; it now closely resembles that of the USA. In the USA, I found that specific mechanisms led to high enforcement levels, including a focus on high financial rewards of settlements and career prospects for law enforcement professionals. In contrast to their Dutch counterparts, US enforcement officials felt confident to engage internationally. I found that US authorities deliberately attempted to influence a change in anti-corruption enforcement cultures abroad. I conclude that the USA’s attempt to globalize its rules has resulted in lasting changes in the Netherlands, the new characteristics having become an integral part of Dutch anti-corruption enforcement culture.