In recent years, research aimed at identifying and relating the antecedents and consequences of diffusing organizational practices/ideas has turned its attention to debating the international adoption and implementation of the Anglo-American model of corporate governance, i.e., a shareholder-value-orientation (SVO). While financial economists characterize the adoption of an SVO as necessary and performance-enhancing, behavioral scientists have disputed such claims, invoking institutional contingencies in the appropriateness of an SVO. Our study seeks to provide some resolution to the debate by developing an overarching socio-political perspective that links the antecedents and consequences of the adoption of the contested practice of SVO. We test our framework using extensive longitudinal data from 1992-2006 from the largest listed corporations in the Netherlands, and we find a negative relationship between SVO adoption and subsequent firm performance, although this effect is attenuated when accompanied by greater SVO-alignment among major owners and a firm’s visible commitment to an SVO. This study extends prior research on the diffusion of contested organizational practices that has taken a socio-political perspective by offering an original contingency perspective that addresses how and why the misaligned preferences of corporate owners will affect (i) a company’s inclination to espouse an SVO, and (ii) the performance consequences of such misalignment.This study suggests when board members are considering the adoption of new ideas/practices (e.g., SVO), they should consider the contextual fitness of the idea/practice with the firm’s owners and their interests.