Response to Imported Case of Marburg Hemorrhagic Fever, the Netherlands

On July 10, 2008, Marburg hemorrhagic fever was confirmed in a Dutch patient who had vacationed recently in Uganda. Exposure most likely occurred in the Python Cave (Maramagambo Forest), which harbors bat species that elsewhere in Africa have been found positive for Marburg virus. A multidisciplinary response team was convened to perform a structured risk assessment, perform risk classification of contacts, issue guidelines for follow-up, provide information, and monitor the crisis response. In total, 130 contacts were identified (66 classified as high risk and 64 as low risk) and monitored fo... Mehr ...

Verfasser: Aura Timen
Marion P.G. Koopmans
Ann C.T.M. Vossen
Gerard J.J. van Doornum
Stephan Günther
Franchette van den Berkmortel
Kees M. Verduin
Sabine Dittrich
Petra Emmerich
Albert D.M.E. Osterhaus
Jaap T. van Dissel
Roel A. Coutinho
Dokumenttyp: Artikel
Erscheinungsdatum: 2009
Reihe/Periodikum: Emerging Infectious Diseases, Vol 15, Iss 8, Pp 1171-1175 (2009)
Verlag/Hrsg.: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
Schlagwörter: Marburg virus diseases / hemorrhagic fever / exposure / contacts / temperature monitoring / filovirus / Medicine / R / Infectious and parasitic diseases / RC109-216
Sprache: Englisch
Permalink: https://search.fid-benelux.de/Record/base-26803149
Datenquelle: BASE; Originalkatalog
Powered By: BASE
Link(s) : https://doi.org/10.3201/eid1508.090015

On July 10, 2008, Marburg hemorrhagic fever was confirmed in a Dutch patient who had vacationed recently in Uganda. Exposure most likely occurred in the Python Cave (Maramagambo Forest), which harbors bat species that elsewhere in Africa have been found positive for Marburg virus. A multidisciplinary response team was convened to perform a structured risk assessment, perform risk classification of contacts, issue guidelines for follow-up, provide information, and monitor the crisis response. In total, 130 contacts were identified (66 classified as high risk and 64 as low risk) and monitored for 21 days after their last possible exposure. The case raised questions specific to international travel, postexposure prophylaxis for Marburg virus, and laboratory testing of contacts with fever. We present lessons learned and results of the follow-up serosurvey of contacts and focus on factors that prevented overreaction during an event with a high public health impact.