Sovereign risk and Dutch disease

I study how, in the presence of default risk, the Dutch disease amplifies an inefficiency in the sectoral allocation of capital. I develop a sovereign default model with production of tradable and non-tradable goods, and endowments of commodities. Default incentives increase when more capital is allocated to non-traded production. Households do not internalize this effect, giving rise to over-investment in the non-traded sector. Commodity windfalls amplify this inefficiency through the classic Dutch disease mechanism and an increased desire to borrow. Policies that reduce the returns of non-tr... Mehr ...

Verfasser: Esquivel, Carlos
Dokumenttyp: doc-type:workingPaper
Erscheinungsdatum: 2024
Verlag/Hrsg.: New Brunswick
NJ: Rutgers University
Department of Economics
Schlagwörter: ddc:330 / F34 / F41 / H63 / Sovereign default / Dutch disease / real exchange rates
Sprache: Englisch
Permalink: https://search.fid-benelux.de/Record/base-26688867
Datenquelle: BASE; Originalkatalog
Powered By: BASE
Link(s) : http://hdl.handle.net/10419/283998

I study how, in the presence of default risk, the Dutch disease amplifies an inefficiency in the sectoral allocation of capital. I develop a sovereign default model with production of tradable and non-tradable goods, and endowments of commodities. Default incentives increase when more capital is allocated to non-traded production. Households do not internalize this effect, giving rise to over-investment in the non-traded sector. Commodity windfalls amplify this inefficiency through the classic Dutch disease mechanism and an increased desire to borrow. Policies that reduce the returns of non-traded capital, such as exchange rate sterilization, ameliorate the degree of over-investment during commodity windfalls. Evidence from spreads, commodity endowments, and exchange rate data supports the main findings of the model.