Dutch employers’ liability for workplace accidents is a very interesting topic, not only from a legal perspective, but also from a law and economics one. It is one of the few systems in Europe where liability is still based on the fault of the employer, whereas most countries apply a form of strict/no-fault liability or a system of no-fault insurance. It is interesting because the Dutch Civil Code explicitly refers to prevention of work-related losses. Law and economics focuses exactly on the behavioural incentives that are provided by tort liability, instead of on the compensation aspect. In this article, I provide an answer to the question of how Dutch employers’ liability compares to the law and economics desiderata. At first glance, the design of this type of liability (fault liability) is contrary to what law and economics would advocate (strict liability). In addition, the level of care that courts require from the employer seems to be excessively high. Interestingly, both characteristics together result in a situation which, from a law and economics perspective, is almost indistinguishable from the desired strict liability. So, two wrongs may make a right: the ‘wrong’ choice for fault liability combined with the ‘wrong’ level of due care results in the ‘right’ application of (quasi) strict liability. Therefore, at least in theory, employers receive the correct behavioural incentives, which induce them to take the optimal level of care and activity. However, when we subsequently turn our attention to employees, things look less perfect. Law and economics scholars argue that in situations where not only the tortfeasor but also the victim can influence accident probability, both parties should receive behavioural incentives. This implies that a rule of strict liability should be accompanied by a defence of contributory or comparative negligence. The Dutch employer liability regime contains a defence of intent or wilful recklessness on the part of the employee. From a law and economics perspective, this ...