Redevelopment of brownfields is placed high on the political agendas in many countries. However, brownfield redevelopment projects are often problematic; the frequent occurrence of conflicts between involved and interdependent stakeholders is directly related to this. To date, tools are lacking to support the complex decisionmaking between stakeholders. The aim of this article is to create a generic model that explains the occurrence of conflict or cooperation in brownfield redevelopment projects. The explicit interaction between these involved stakeholders is modeled as an interdependent process, using a relative novel approach in which conjoint analysis and game theory are combined. Resulting data analysis shows that there is one major source of conflicts; stakeholders choosing not to cooperate based upon the presented game-setting. Other possible sources of conflict, like difficulties in reaching a stable outcome or incomprehensibility of the game-setting, proved to have a limited contribution to the occurrence of conflicts. A more in-depth analysis of game-settings ending up in mutual cooperation showed that the appraisal of both stakeholders for the proposed development plan is the most influential factor, together with an eventual absolute difference between both players’ appraisals. Furthermore, stakeholders having a relatively weak power position within projects tend to prefer a non-cooperative attitude, and having some ‘change’ can be beneficial for achieving mutual cooperation. If stakeholders have the prospect of achieving extra value through mutual plan optimization, they tend to be more willing to act cooperatively.