Regime spoiler or regime pawn: The military and distributional conflict in non-democracies
Distributional conflict among a ruling class, the military, and citizens. * The military's loyalty is different in different equilibria. * Increase in natural resources can make the citizens worse off. * Other results are discussed. I consider a model in which an autocrat can be removed from power either through a military coup or a revolution by the citizens. In the event of a revolt by the citizens, the military may choose to support the autocrat to crush the revolt or play a passive role. The autocrat determines the distribution of the country's wealth among himself, the military, and the c... Mehr ...
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Dokumenttyp: | Artikel |
Reihe/Periodikum: | Journal of comparative economics |
Verlag/Hrsg.: |
Amsterdam,
Elsevier
|
Sprache: | Englisch |
ISSN: | 0147-5967 |
Weitere Identifikatoren: | doi: 10.1016/j.jce.2014.04.004 |
Permalink: | https://search.fid-benelux.de/Record/olc-benelux-1965000924 |
URL: | NULL NULL |
Datenquelle: | Online Contents Benelux; Originalkatalog |
Powered By: | Verbundzentrale des GBV (VZG) |
Link(s) : | http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2014.04.004
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2014.04.004 |
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