Regime spoiler or regime pawn: The military and distributional conflict in non-democracies

Distributional conflict among a ruling class, the military, and citizens. * The military's loyalty is different in different equilibria. * Increase in natural resources can make the citizens worse off. * Other results are discussed. I consider a model in which an autocrat can be removed from power either through a military coup or a revolution by the citizens. In the event of a revolt by the citizens, the military may choose to support the autocrat to crush the revolt or play a passive role. The autocrat determines the distribution of the country's wealth among himself, the military, and the c... Mehr ...

Verfasser: J. Atsu Amegashie
Dokumenttyp: Artikel
Reihe/Periodikum: Journal of comparative economics
Verlag/Hrsg.: Amsterdam, Elsevier
Sprache: Englisch
ISSN: 0147-5967
Weitere Identifikatoren: doi: 10.1016/j.jce.2014.04.004
Permalink: https://search.fid-benelux.de/Record/olc-benelux-1965000924
URL: NULL
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Datenquelle: Online Contents Benelux; Originalkatalog
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Link(s) : http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2014.04.004
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2014.04.004
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